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Abstract 
Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) are widely used over the 
Internet as they provide a simple and elegant way of 
interaction between the client and the server. This paper 
proposes a solution for securing the remote procedure 
calls (RPC) by tunneling it through HTTPS (Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer). RPC over 
HTTP actually uses the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
protocol as a transport for the traffic. SSL mandates that 
the server authenticates itself to the client using a digital 
certificate (and associated private key). SSL is normally 
configured to encrypt traffic before transmitting it 
between the server and client and vice versa. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“RPC over HTTPS" tries to provide a solution to 
secure the Remote Procedure calls made by a client 
outside a network to access the Server services. These 
services can now be accessed via internet securely using 
the https protocol. 
 Remote Procedure Call data or traffic will be 
encapsulated in http protocol so that the data can pass 
through internet services. Using HTTP with SSL i.e. 
HTTPS makes the authentication and authorization 
easy and adds security to the traffic. 
 
2. Issues using current RPC implementation 
 
 While RPC provides an elegant mechanism for 
client-server interaction, it suffers from the following 
problems: 
 
2.1. RPC usually uses TCP or UDP directly and 
different RPC servers use different port numbers. Site 
administrators usually firewall access to these non-
standard ports and this prevents use of RPC on the 
internet to talk to servers. Site administrators like to open  
 
port access to only a few well tested services like http 
and ftp, due to the scare of possible vulnerabilities in new 
services. 
 
 
2.2. RPC traffic is not secure, that is, it is not confidential 
and tamper-proof. RPC messages can be snooped and 
modified without getting noticed. It suffers from common 
security problems such as authentication and 
authorization.   
 
 
3. Proposed Solution 
 
Since HTTP is a widely used and trusted protocol with 
almost all sites allowing it to pass through their firewalls, 
encapsulating RPC in http would solve problem 1 stated 
in Section 2.2 Using HTTPS would solve problem 2 
stated in Section 2.2 The resulting communication will 
have all the properties of the secured protocol and will in 
turn secure the Remote Procedure Calls. 
 By doing this as a generic RPC encapsulating 
facility, any client/server application that uses RPC will 
immediately benefit from it. Some of the applications are 
– NFS, Microsoft Exchange/Outlook and other 
applications listed above. Thus all these applications will 
become immediately accessible over the internet. 
 
4. Related Work
 [2]
 
. As of now the only application that wraps the Remote 
Procedure Calls in Text protocols such as HTTP/HTTPS 
is the Microsoft Outlook(2003).   
 The RPC protocol allows Outlook 2003 MAPI 
clients to connect to Exchange 2003 Servers. Because of 
very restrictive firewall rules which typically allow port 
access for only HTTP; this prevents remote users from 
accessing Exchange Servers directly. Blocking secure 
RPC connections prevents your remote users from 
benefiting from the full Outlook MAPI client. 
Microsoft realized the magnitude of this problem. 
Their solution is the RPC over HTTP protocol. This 
protocol allows remote Outlook 2003 clients to connect to 
Exchange 2003 Servers using HTTP or HTTPS. The RPC 
protocol commands and data are "wrapped" (as known as 
encapsulated) in an HTTP header. The firewall in front of 
the Outlook 2003 MAPI client only sees the HTTP header 
and passes the outbound connection through. The RPC 
over HTTP protocols allows your remote users to get 
around what might be considered an overly zealous 
approach to outbound access control. 
However, Microsoft's solution is not generalized for 
other RPC applications.  There are no open source 
implementations available for such wrapping and security 
of the RPCs. Hence our project will provide a generalized 
solution for the security issues for applications using 
RPCs. 
 
 
 
 
5. Using HTTP as RPC Transport 
 RPC-over-HTTP enables client programs to use 
the Internet to execute procedures provided by server 
programs on distant networks. RPC over HTTP tunnels its 
calls through an established HTTP port. Thus, its calls can 
cross network firewalls on both the client and server 
networks. 
RPC over HTTP routes its calls to the RPC proxy 
located on the RPC server's network. The RPC Proxy 
establishes and maintains a connection to the RPC server. 
It serves as a proxy, dispatching remote procedure calls to 
the RPC server and sending the server's replies back 
across the Internet to the client application.  
When the client program issues a remote procedure 
call using HTTP as the transport, the RPC run-time library 
on the client contacts the RPC proxy. Depending on 
whether the RPC client was asked to use HTTP or HTTPS 
(HTTP with SSL) port 80 or port 443 is used, 
respectively. The RPC proxy contacts the RPC server 
program and establishes a TCP/IP connection. The client 
and the RPC proxy maintain their HTTP or HTTPS 
connection across the Internet. The client's HTTP or 
HTTPS connection to the RPC proxy can pass through a 
firewall (subject to appropriate access permissions) if one 
is present. The server can then execute the remote 
procedure call and use the connection through the RPC 
proxy to reply to the client.  
If either the client or the server disconnects for any 
reason, the RPC proxy will detect it and end the RPC 
session. As long as the session continues, the RPC proxy 
will maintain its connections to the client and the server. It 
will forward remote procedure calls from the client to the 
server, and send replies from the server to the client. 
 
6. RPC over HTTPS security 
 
RPC over HTTPS provides three types of security in 
addition to standard RPC security, which results in RPC 
over HTTPS traffic being protected once by RPC, and 
then doubly protected by the tunneling mechanism 
provided by RPC over HTTPS. The RPC over HTTPS 
tunneling mechanism adds to normal RPC security in the 
following manner: 
1. Provides SSL encryption and RPC Proxy verification              
(mutual authentication).  
2. Provides restrictions on the RPC Proxy level dictating 
which machines on the server network are allowed to 
receive RPC over HTTPS calls. 
 
7. Implementation Details 
 
TCPFilter 
The tcpfilter program sits between the client like a web 
browser and the server to filter the data transfer between 
the client and the server.  
The requests sent by the client ie client data is served 
by the filter and passed to the server. The server data 
written to a particular port can be sent to the client 
through the tcpfilter. 
Tcpfilter is a in between program which acts as a 
server for the client and a client for the server at the same 
time. 
For a web browser tcpfilter is run using the following 
format: 
tcpfilter <source port> <destination machine> 
<destination port>  
eg: tcpfilter 80 192.168.0.1 100 
(In the above example a server program is running on 
192.168.0.1 which dumps data on port 100. Client ie web 
browser gets the data from the port 100 through the 
tcpfilter) 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1: TCPFilter 
 
 
Figure 2 : Data Transfer Algorithm 
 
 
 
Portmapper: 
Once the tcp data was transferred through the tcpfilter 
the need was to get the rpc traffic between client and 
server through the filter. 
The portmapper utility gives us the methods to register 
the program number and version number pair to the 
specific port. 
This module registers the specific port numbers to the 
“nfs” and “mountd” programs. 
 
Nfs program number: 100005  Version numbers : 1 , 2 
, 3 
 
Mountd program number: 100003  Version numbers : 
2 , 3 , 4 
 
This registering ensures that the filter sends the data to 
the specific code which in turn is sent to the nfs and mount 
daemons. 
 
  
 
  RPCFILTER 
RPCFilter combines the registering program and the 
TCPFilter into one module which helps to filter the rpc 
traffic between client and server. 
Now RPC call requests like mount are serviced by the 
rpcfilter. RPCFilter send the rpc call request packets from 
client to the nfs server machine using the registered ports. 
The server services the request and sends the rpc response 
packets back to the rpcfilter which in turn send the 
response packets to the client where the rpc call was 
made. This completes one RPC Request-Response cycle.    
RPCFilter program is run at the client side. The 
invoking format is as follows: 
 
rpcfilter <server machine address> <program number> 
<version numbers> 
 
Every time 2 instances of the filter are invoked at the 
client, one for nfs (100005) and another for mountd 
(100003). 
 
 rpcfilter   192.168.0.1  100005   1   2   3 
 
 rpcfilter   192.168.0.1  100003   2   3   4 
 
Where 192.168.0.1 is the address of the nfs server 
machine. 
 
 
Figure 3 : RPCFilter 
 
 
Server Module: 
 
The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) is a 
standard for interfacing external applications 
with information servers, such as HTTP or Web 
servers. A plain HTML document that the Web 
daemon retrieves is static, which means it 
exists in a constant state: a text file that doesn't 
change. A CGI program, on the other hand, is 
executed in real-time, so that it can output 
dynamic information. 
 
We use the property of CGI to execute at real 
time for decapsulating RPC(binary) data from 
HTTP which is a text protocol. The RPC data is 
POSTed by the client (rpcFilter) to the web 
server(Apache HTTPD) by setting the content 
type to application/stream. Apache web server 
removes the POST headers in the byte stream 
from client (rpcFilter) and makes the byte 
stream available to the standard input of the CGI 
bin program. Hence we get the entire RPC call 
at the standard input of the CGI bin program 
which is stored in the input buffer. 
 
The CGI program gets the program 
number(prog) and version number(vers) by 
extracting the appropriate unsigned 32-bit 
integers. The program number and version 
number are used to get the port 
number(portnum) which gives the port on which 
the RPC program is running on local machine. 
The CGI program uses the pmap_getport() 
function in <rpc/rpc.h> to get the port number.  
 
The CGI program uses the port number on 
which the required RPC program is running to 
create a socket on local machine. The CGI 
program connects this socket to the port of RPC 
program. Now the entire input buffer is written 
to the socket. The RPC RFC doesn’t distinguish 
between different machines on the network. So 
the RPC call to the same program and version 
with same parameters will have identical RPC 
call records. This property is exploited by 
writing the entire RPC call record to the socket 
connecting the RPC program. This means CGI 
program is now making a RPC call to the local 
machine. 
 
The CGI program then receives the response 
from the RPC program on the same socket. It 
reads the response record from the RPC 
program into the output buffer. The CGI 
program now adds HTML header and footers to 
the output buffer and sends the data to its 
standard output. Apache web server sends this 
RPC response encapsulated in HTTP to the 
client (rpcFilter). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A generalized solution for securing Remote Procedure 
Calls over HTTP was implemented. With this solution a 
client can make RPC calls securely on servers behind 
Firewalls. The HTTPS protocol introduces security 
services such as authentication and authorization to RPC 
call response mechanism. An Open Source solution for 
accessing Server services over internet (using https) which 
bypasses the need for a Virtual Private Network was 
provided.  
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